Dialogues of Polemarchus. by Epstein, Lee
IDIALOGUES OF POLEMARCHUS
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POLEMARCHUS, was present at the discussions which Plato
• purports to have recorded and which took place between his
teacher, Socrates, and several others. From love of his teacher,
whom the Fates have seen fit to honor with martxrdom, Plato has
been moved to change man\- of the facts. I ha\e here set down the
dialogues as I remember them, beginning about that place in the
discussion that Plato reaches at the middle of Book Five. L'p to
this place, Plato's account has been more or less true, save for the
fact that he has Thrac_\machus depart at the brink of defeat. This
is an apparent ruse to protect his master by not telling what actually
happened.
At this point Thracymachus interrupted Socrates, saying, O
!
Socrates, you make us rash promises and \ou give us back our own
words chewed over. I!y dint of clever manipulations you show us
something which we never see, and you throw us off from the quest
of the real essence of the Truth.
I promise nothing. I merely tried to show that there was a
problem, and then tried to solve it along with you.
Aye, but by our questions with hidden implications, you could
])rove anything. I bow to your superior skill as a Sophist, but as
a philosopher—tell }'our nurse to get you a coral string to chew
lest you chew the eternal truths to shreds with your Sophistry, Do
_\-ou believe that there is such a thing as Truth?
Certainly.
.\nd that Truth exists independent of belief in it? 1 moan that
if everyone in all Greece believed a lie. the truth would still e.xist
anvwavr?
Of course.
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Ami tl»at if one man diil not believe the lie. lie woulil know tlie
truth?
Yes.
I>o you believe also that there i> such a thing as good?
Most assure<ll\.
.\n«l that even though evervono in the world did wrong, there
would still exist go«»d. as an idea or a concept?
I think so.
.•\nd that if one man did not do wrong, he would know good?
.\ye.
How then, do you reconcile the idea of a basic good and a
basic truth, independent of acceptance or denial, to your idea of
justice, which (}ou say) can exist only in a perfect state? If it
is possible for the whole world to be untrue, or evil, and for one
man to be true or good, how then is it impossible for one man to
be just while the whole world is unjust?
Socrates was silent.
If only one man were alive, then according to the definition you
have given us. he must be unjust. You maintain that justice is a
jmsitive virtue—a characteristic of the just state. I maintain that
it is a negative virtue. It is the absence of a fault. It is the pur-
suance of a course of action which will hurt no one unnecessarily,
and which will involve nothing mean or cruel. Of necessity, then.
a man living alone would be just, for it would be impossible for
him to be unjust to any but himself. However, his intentions to
himself would always be just, and an act intended justly is a just
act. Mind, I am making no definitions, but merely naming some
of the characteristics of justice. I have learned many of your
tricks, Socrates.
He that as it may, you have not shown wherein my definition
is false.
Your definition, pray? .\nd was that a definition? Let us
supfxjse that I asked you the way to Sparta. If \riu replied that
I should set out. and that when I reached Sparta I should find niv-
self there, would you call these directions?
.Assuredly not.
How. then, can you say that you have given me a definition of
justice when >ou say that justice will be the characteristic of a just
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But- I showed you the waj" to make the just state. If I said,
in directing you to Sparta, go this way, then that, and then, after
so many hours walking, you would be in Sparta, you would call
these good directions, would you not ?
Perhaps, if they took me to Sparta.
Well, when I told you to do this, and that, and then, after cer-
tain results were achieved, you would have justice, have 1 not
given you good directions for the achievement of justice?
Ah, Socrates, a great power for circumlocution is yours. You
did tell us that a just state would educate our children as soon as
they were old enough to leave their mother's breasts, and that peo-
ple would be divided into three classes. Does justice, then, consist
of child-maintenance, or of division into classes? In a word, }ou
told us some of the characteristics of a just state, but \ou did not
tell us where we could find justice in the state—where we were to
find the just methods of achieving these ends.
At this moment Glaucon and Adeimantus interposed. sa_\ing that
they. too. had noticed this deficiency, but had not spoken lest the\'
appear dull and stupid.
The true, philosopher, answered Socrates, is never afraid to
.speak lest he be thought stupid. He knows that doubt is the be-
ginning of all knowledge. He is not afraid to confess his ignorance
in order to open the path to newer truths. He is like an apprentice
to a . . . .
That is all very well, Socrates, but answer our objections. Tell
us where we can find justice in the state.
Observe, Thracymachus, the world about \ou. You will see
that everything is divided into the realm of the real and the unreal.
(Here followed the long speech reported by Plato in his Dialogue
on Immortality) . . . Thus, the essence of justice belongs to
the realm of the real—the invisible. I cannot point it out to you,
but I can tell you of what it consists. You are right. 1 told you
the characteristics of a just state, and it is in the fulfillment of these
characteristics, in the every part of the state performing adequalelv
its functions that justice consists. It is a co-ordination of all the
parts to the whole.
It is, then, only in such a stale as you outline that justice may
exist?
Ave.
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I ihink you make an error. You outlined that state, no doulit,
with the ideal of justice al\vay^ before you.
I tli>l.
Well, you have not told us what that idea was. It existed before
the state, if you modeled the state upon it, and it may exist after
your idea of the just state chanijes. \in\ will admit that altlioujih
there is onlv one essence of good, at dilTerent times we deem dif-
ferent things to be good?
Agreed.
Then, as there must he some essence of justice, may we not at
different times think different states to be just? What >ou lia\c
done is to say that the philosopher-king will know what justice is.
and from this knowledge will outline principles which will make the
state just and good. Justice, you therefore define along with good-
ness as characteristics of the just and good state. We are still in
the dark as to the real meaning of justice or of goodness.
Socrates was silent.
You further .set forth the principle that we are not working for
the immediate good of the individual, but for that of the state,
and that a state which is good and happy will ultimately consist
of good and happy individuals, for the individual is part of the
state.
So I maintain.
Rut I do not agree. Is it not true that if, for instance, Xiceratus
were to give all of his wealth to the state, the state would perhaps be
happier?
Yes.
Dut Xiceratus would not he happy. It is perfectly possible to
conceive of acts which are unjust to the individual and would bring
him sorrow and pain, but which are to what you would call the
ultimate good of the state as a whole. What we had been wiser
to see is that if we make every individual ha[)i)y, and treat him
justly, surely the state must be a just and a happy one, for the
state is the sum of all the individuals.
.At this moment, Thracymachus' servant came up and notified
him that this cousin from Ithaca had arrived, and was awaiting
him at his home, whereujwn Thracymachus took leave of all most
courteously, saying. I hope to continue later this pleasant discussion.
Bah! said Socrates.
